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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________ 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to determine whether loans made 
pursuant to the terms of an employment contract, and which are 
used to repay educational debt, are non-dischargeable within the 
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).  The Bankruptcy Court concluded 
that they are dischargeable.  Because we do not believe that such 
loans are educational in nature and are therefore not subject to 
the non-dischargeability exception set forth in section 
523(a)(8), we will affirm. 
 I. 
 On June 20, 1978, Appellee Dr. Elizabeth Crowe Segal 
("Dr. Crowe") signed a Scholarship Program Contract ("Scholarship 
  
Contract") with the National Health Service Corps ("NHSC"), which 
allowed her to receive educational benefits from, and caused her 
to incur an obligation to, the NHSC.1  Under the terms of the 
contract, Dr. Crowe received medical school tuition support and 
various stipends during the course of her studies, which she 
completed in 1982.  Also in 1982, Dr. Crowe married Appellee Dr. 
Stanton Segal ("Dr. Segal") who was at no time a party to, nor 
obligated under, the Scholarship Contract.2 
 Pursuant to the Scholarship Contract, Dr. Crowe became 
obligated, upon her graduation from medical school, to provide 
medical services for approximately four years at a location 
designated by the NHSC.  She apparently received a deferment to 
begin service immediately after completing a residency, and she 
began practicing at an approved NHSC site in Jasper, Florida, in 
July 1986.  Dr. Crowe worked at the Jasper site until April 1989, 
thereby satisfying all but approximately 19 months of her 
four-year obligation to NHSC.  At that time, Dr. Crowe elected to 
satisfy the remaining obligation under the Scholarship Program by 
way of repayment.  (The Scholarship Contract provided that in 
lieu of services, a cash payment could be made to satisfy the 
obligation.  See 42 U.S.C. § 254o.)  The means by which Dr. Crowe 
                     
1
.   Section 751 of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 
§ 294t) established the National Health Service Corps Scholarship 
Program and authorized the Secretary of Health, Education and 
Welfare to provide applicants selected to be participants in the 
program with scholarship awards. 
2
.   For ease of reference and where appropriate, we will 
occasionally refer to Dr. Crowe and Dr. Segal as the "debtors."  
  
obtained the funds to satisfy her obligation to the NHSC, 
detailed below, give rise to the controversy over the scope of 
section 523(a)(8). 
 During the time that Dr. Crowe was practicing in 
Jasper, Dr. Segal became affiliated with Lake Shore Hospital in 
Lake City, Florida.  Lake Shore Hospital is owned by Santa Fe 
HealthCare, Inc. ("HealthCare"), which also owns Appellant Santa 
Fe Medical Services ("Santa Fe"), a Gainesville, Florida, 
nonprofit corporation.  HealthCare was recruiting physicians to 
provide Obstetrics and Gynecological ("OB\GYN") services in the 
area surrounding Lake Shore Hospital.  Dr. Crowe was both willing 
and able to provide these medical services, but she first had to 
satisfy her obligation to the NHSC.  After some negotiation, Dr. 
Crowe and Santa Fe, by and through its principal, HealthCare, 
entered into a Physician Employment Contract ("Employment 
Contract"), the terms of which included a loan from Santa Fe to 
Dr. Crowe.  Section 7 of the Employment Contract provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 (a)  In addition to [Dr. Crowe's] salary, 
SantaFe shall loan [Dr. Crowe] up to Two 
Hundred Thousand dollars ($200,000) upon the 
execution of this Agreement by the Physician 
and upon the execution of the attached 
promissory note by the Physician and her 
husband.  Said amount shall be used solely 
and exclusively to satisfy the Physician's 
obligation to the United States National 
Health Service. 
 The promissory note referred to in Section 7 of the 
Employment Contract states at the outset: 
 For value received, we Betsy Crowe, M.D., and 
Stanton Segal, M.D. (collectively referred to 
  
as "the Maker") promise to pay to the order 
of SantaFe Medical Services, Inc. ("Payee") 
the sum of Two Hundred Thousand dollars 
($200,000.00) in the following manner:  in 
thirty-six equal monthly payments of then 
outstanding principal each, beginning May 15, 
1991, and due on the first day of each month 
thereafter until the entire amount is paid, 
with interest on the unpaid balance at the 
prime rate . . . . 
 In accordance with the provisions of the Employment 
Contract, Santa Fe loaned the Debtors $182,619.17, an amount 
which corresponds to the precise figure owed by Dr. Crowe to the 
NHSC.3  On October 31, 1989, Santa Fe issued a check for that 
amount made payable to the Debtors and the Health Resources and 
Services Administration, a division of the then Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.4  The Debtors do not dispute that 
they received this amount, nor is there any suggestion that the 
funds were not paid to the NHSC. 
 II. 
 It is likewise undisputed that by April 29, 1992, the 
date upon which Drs. Crowe and Segal filed a petition for 
bankruptcy relief under Chapter 7, they had repaid only $5,000 to 
Santa Fe. 
 Santa Fe filed a Complaint to Determine 
Dischargeability in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
                     
3
.   Although the promissory note indicates that the amount owed 
was $200,000, it is undisputed that the actual amount of the debt 
was $182,619.17. 
4
.   The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was 
redesignated the Department of Health and Human Services in 1979. 
Pub. L. 96-88, Title V, § 509(b), Oct. 17, 1979, 93 Stat. 695. 
  
Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking a declaration that the 
loan it made to Dr. Crowe and Dr. Segal in 1989 was non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(8).  After discovery was 
completed, the Debtors filed a motion for summary judgment 
requesting a dismissal of the adversary action with respect to 
Dr. Segal because (1) he was not the student-debtor and had, 
therefore, received no educational benefits and (2) the loan 
itself was not the type of loan covered by section 523(a)(8).  
Upon the court's suggestion that a determination of the second 
issue in the Debtors' favor, i.e., that the loan was not an 
educational loan, would resolve the claim against Dr. Crowe as 
well, the motion was amended and brought on behalf of both 
debtors.  Prior to the court's ruling on the motion and Santa 
Fe's cross-motion which followed, we decided In re Pelkowski, 990 
F.2d 737 (3d Cir. 1993), wherein we definitively resolved the 
issue whether a non-student co-obligor may discharge a debt under 
section 523(a)(8), without proving one of the statutory 
exceptions, in favor of the creditor.5 
                     
5
.   There are two statutory exceptions to the non-
dischargeability of a student loan which remain available to both 
the student and non-student debtor, i.e., that the loan came due 
more than seven years before the bankruptcy filing, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8)(A), or that non-discharge of the debt would create 
"undue hardship," 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(8)(B).  In re Pelkowski, 990 
F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 1993).  The Debtors, however, do not 
assert the applicability of either exception in this proceeding.  
  
 The bankruptcy court found the debt dischargeable.6  
Santa Fe appealed and the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania affirmed.  This appeal followed.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d). 
 Our review of the district court's decision 
"effectively amounts to review of the bankruptcy court's opinion 
in the first instance."  In re Roth American, Inc., 975 F.2d 949, 
952 (3d Cir. 1992), quoting In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 
1217, 1222 (3d Cir. 1989).  Insofar as this case turns on the 
interpretation of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code, our review 
is plenary.  Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 739.  We review de novo the 
bankruptcy court's order granting summary judgment.  In re 
Pilcher, 149 B.R. 595 (9th BAP 1993). 
 III. 
 The question before us is one of statutory 
construction.  Accordingly, we begin with the familiar canon that 
the starting point for interpreting a statute is its plain 
language, Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 588 (1989), although 
                     
6
.   The bankruptcy court elected not to determine the 
dischargeability of the debt as to Dr. Segal because its 
determination that the Santa Fe loan did not represent an 
educational debt within in the meaning of section 523(a)(8) 
proved to be dispositive.  Appellees argue that the circumstances 
of this case, i.e., the nature of the loan and the timing of Dr. 
Segal's co-execution, distinguish it from Pelkowski and that a 
remand for further argument on the issue of dischargeability with 
respect to Dr. Segal as co-obligor would be proper in the event 
we decide section 523(a)(8) does not apply to the loan.  Because 
we will affirm the district court's determination that the loan 
is dischargeable under section 523(a)(8), this issue is moot. 
  
we hasten to note that in certain instances "plain language" can 
be an oxymoron.  We have previously determined that where "the 
terms of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is 
complete except in rare circumstances."  Taylor v. Freeland & 
Kronz, 938 F.2d 420, 424 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 503 U.S. 638 
(1992), quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991).  
Such circumstances are present only in the "rare" case where the 
"literal application of the statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters[,]" id., 
quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 242 (1989), or where the result would be "so bizarre that 
Congress 'could not have intended' it."  Id., quoting Demarest, 
498 U.S. at 191. 
 Title 11 of the United States Code, at section 
523(a)(8), provides: 
 (a) A discharge under section 727, 1141 or 
1128(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title 
does not discharge an individual debtor from 
any debt --  
 
 *  *  *  *  
 
 (8) for an educational benefit overpayment 
or loan made, insured or guaranteed by a 
governmental unit, or made under any program 
funded in whole or in part by a governmental 
unit or nonprofit institution, or for an 
obligation to repay funds received as an 
educational benefit, scholarship or stipend 
. . . 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1990).  
 Despite our recent conclusion that the language of 
section 523(a)(8) was unambiguous and that resort to legislative 
  
history was, therefore, unnecessary, see Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 
741-42, an analysis of the issues presented in this case cannot 
avoid some discussion of the evolution of section 523(a)(8). 
 IV. 
 The Bankruptcy Code was drafted to provide a discharge 
procedure that enables insolvent Debtors to reorder their affairs 
and enjoy "a new opportunity in life with a clear field for 
future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of 
preexisting debt."  Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991), 
quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).  But 
Congress elected to exclude certain obligations from the general 
policy of discharge where the public policy at issue outweighs 
the debtors need for a fresh start.  See Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 
744-45; In re Merchant, 958 F.2d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 1992).  Among 
the exceptions, which are to be narrowly construed against the 
creditor and in favor of the debtor, Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 744, 
is the proviso in section 523(a)(8) that educational loans be 
non-dischargeable. 
 When originally enacted in 1978, section 523(a)(8) 
referred only to obligations "to a governmental unit, or a 
nonprofit institution of higher education for an educational 
loan."  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 
92 Stat. 2549 (1978).  Clearly under that version of the statute, 
the debt to Santa Fe would be dischargeable, regardless of its 
classification as an educational loan.  Santa Fe is neither a 
governmental unit nor a nonprofit institution of higher 
education. 
  
 The subsection was amended in 1979 to include 
"educational loan[s] made, insured or guaranteed by a 
governmental unit, or made under any program funded in whole or 
in part by a governmental unit, or a nonprofit institution of 
higher education."  Act of August 14, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-56, 
§ 3(1), 93 Stat. 387 (1979) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) 
(Supp. 1979)).  The debt at issue in this case still would have 
been dischargeable, as the loan by Santa Fe was not made, insured 
or guaranteed by a governmental entity. 
 Section 523(a)(8) was again expanded by section 
454(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Amendment Act of 1984, wherein the 
clause "of higher education" was deleted to eliminate the 
inference that the section applied only to nonprofit institutions 
associated with higher education.  Bankruptcy Amendments and 
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, Title III, 
§ 454(a)(2), 98 Stat. 333 (Supp. 1984) (amending 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8) (1982)).  As a result of the 1979 and 1984 
amendments, educational loans made by commercial, for-profit 
institutions were non-dischargeable if they were insured or 
guaranteed by a governmental entity, or if the loans were made 
pursuant to an educational lending program involving a nonprofit 
institution.  See In re Merchant, 958 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(loan made by commercial bank was assigned to a nonprofit 
university pursuant to an agreement by the university to purchase 
all defaulted student loans); In re Pilcher, 149 B.R. 595 (9th 
B.A.P. 1993) (nonprofit entities, while not involved in the 
debtor's particular loan, were involved in the program by which 
  
the loan was made).  Likewise, educational loans made by 
nonprofit institutions became dischargeable if they were made as 
part of an educational loan program.  In re Roberts, 149 B.R. 547 
(C.D. Ill. 1993) (educational loan by a nonprofit credit union 
pursuant to an established educational loan program held to be 
non-dischargeable). 
 Subsection 523(a)(8) was yet again expanded by the 
Crime Control Act of 1990.7  The revised statute made 
non-dischargeable educational benefits and overpayments as well 
as educational loans, and increased from five to seven years the 
time interval in section 523(a)(8).  Most relevant to this case, 
however, was the addition of language which prohibited the 
discharge of "an obligation to repay funds received as an 
educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend."  Crime Control Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3631(a), 104 Stat. 4865 (1990) 
(amending 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1984)).  As discussed below, 
Santa Fe suggests that the debt here represents such an 
obligation. 
                     
7
.   The effective date of these amendments was 180 days from 
November 29, 1990, the date of enactment.  Crime Control Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, §§ 3621, 3631, 104 Stat. 4789, 
4964-4965, 4966 (1990).  Because this case was filed in April 
1992, the amendments are applicable. 
  
 V. 
 Santa Fe raises two contentions in its effort to 
persuade us that the Debtors' loan obligation is non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(8). 
 A. 
 Santa Fe initially claims that the obligation 
represents a debt for an "educational benefit overpayment or loan 
. . . made under any program funded in whole or in part by a 
governmental unit or nonprofit institution," focussing almost 
exclusively on whether the loan to Dr. Crowe in 1989 was made 
"under any program."  
 For this argument to prevail, Santa Fe would first have 
to establish that the loan to Dr. Crowe was for "educational 
purposes."  In re Shipman, 33 B.R. 80 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).  
But even if we were to assume, as the bankruptcy court did, that 
the loan from Santa Fe to Dr. Crowe was an educational loan, our 
analysis would not end there.  Under both the former and present 
versions of section 523(a)(8), it is insufficient for purposes of 
establishing non-dischargeability that a nonprofit institution 
make an educational loan; instead, the loan must also have been 
made pursuant to some program.  See Pub. L. Nos. 96-56, § 3(1), 
93 Stat. 387 (1979); 98-353, § 454(a)(2), 98 Stat. 333 (Supp. 
1984); and 101-647, § 3631(a), 104 Stat. 4865 (1990).  Although 
Santa Fe now claims that it and the Debtors created a program 
that was carefully outlined in the Employment Contract and the 
promissory note, that is not enough, for the record is devoid of 
evidence that the loan was made under any program funded in whole 
  
or in part by either Santa Fe (a nonprofit institution) or a 
governmental entity.  Santa Fe did not make a practice of buying 
out student debt to obtain employees, nor did it have procedures 
in place for making such arrangements.  As far as we can tell, 
this was a unique, unprecedented arrangement created specifically 
to facilitate the acquisition of Dr. Crowe as a staff physician. 
 Santa Fe argues alternatively that educational benefits 
and loans need not be made pursuant to a program to be non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(8).  In support of its 
argument, Santa Fe relies upon In re Najafi, 154 B.R. 185 (Bankr. 
E.D. Pa. 1993), wherein the court concluded that an obligation 
for an educational benefit, although not made pursuant to a 
program was, "at least to some extent," within the scope of 
section 523(a)(8) because the debtor received an "educational 
benefit" which he failed to pay for.  Najafi, 154 B.R. at 190.  
The Najafi court held non-dischargeable a former student's 
obligation to Cabrini College in Radnor, Pennsylvania, despite 
the fact that the college "was not adhering to its normal 
policies" when it allowed the debtor to register and attend 
classes without first paying his tuition in full.  The court 
determined that it was "fair . . . to decide the debtor's 
liability to Cabrini on an equitable basis rather than by 
strictly applying the policies set forth in Cabrini's catalogue."  
Id. at 191. 
 In Najafi, however, the court first determined that the 
advance of credit constituted an "educational loan."  Although 
the court later noted that the college deviated from its normal 
  
practice in admitting Najafi without advance payment, the 
question was not raised whether the loan constituted a part of 
the school's overall financial aid program.  In the present case, 
there clearly was no educational loan "program"; rather there was 
the single loan made to Dr. Crowe.  To the extent that Najafi 
could be interpreted as not requiring a "program," we reject its 
reasoning as inconsistent with the statute. 
 B. 
 Santa Fe's principal contention focusses on the 1990 
amendment to section 523(a)(8), which rendered non-dischargeable 
an "obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, 
scholarship, or stipend."  Implicit in Santa Fe's argument is the 
assumption that any lender -- commercial or nonprofit -- which 
provides funds which, in turn, are used to repay an educational 
loan obligation, a fortiori, has provided "funds received as an 
educational benefit . . . ."  This argument must fail, however, 
because as we have already noted, the only educational benefits 
or stipends provided to Dr. Crowe were provided by the NHSC and 
not by Santa Fe. 
 Moreover, as the bankruptcy court correctly noted, 
Santa Fe's interpretation of section 523(a)(8) is overly broad.  
Under its interpretation, if Dr. Crowe had repaid the NHSC from a 
combination of her savings and a personal or unsecured commercial 
loan (e.g., a credit card cash advance), the personal or 
commercial loan would be non-dischargeable under the 1990 
amendment.  But the language of the subsection simply does not 
support the proffered construction.  Santa Fe might stand on 
  
firmer ground if, for instance, section 523(a)(8) referred to "an 
obligation to repay funds received as or used to repay an 
educational benefit, scholarship, or stipend."  Clearly, though, 
Congress did not enact such a provision, and neither the plain 
language of the 1990 amendment nor the policies which underlie 
the subsection support such an interpretation. 
 VI. 
 Although limited, the legislative history of 
section 523(a)(8) teaches that the exclusion of educational loans 
from the discharge provisions was designed to remedy abuses of 
the educational loan system by restricting the ability of a 
student to discharge an educational loan by filing for bankruptcy 
shortly after graduation, and to safeguard the financial 
integrity of educational loan programs.  See, e.g., 124 Cong. 
Rec. 1791-98 (1978); Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743.  By enacting 
section 523(a)(8), Congress sought principally to protect 
government entities and nonprofit institutions of higher 
education -- places which lend money or guarantee loans to 
individuals for educational purposes -- from bankruptcy 
discharge.  Because such loans are not based upon a borrower's 
proven credit-worthiness, and because they serve a purpose which 
Congress sought to encourage, section 523(a)(8) protects the 
lender when a borrower, who often would not qualify under 
traditional underwriting standards, files a chapter 7 bankruptcy.  
See In re Merchant, 958 F.2d at 740.  
 In its continuing effort to prevent such abuses and to 
protect the solvency of educational loan programs, Congress 
  
passed a series of amendments to section 523(a)(8) which extended 
its reach from educational loans to educational benefits.  The 
amendments also extended the protection afforded under section 
523(a)(8) to any lender, in certain limited circumstances.  
Metaphorically speaking, the modification process not only 
expanded subsection (8) to catch more fish in its non-
dischargeability net, but has also narrowed the subsection to 
keep them from escaping.  Epstein, Nickles & White, BANKRUPTCY: 
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES, Vol. 2, § 7-33. at 395 (West 1992).  
Despite the expansive amendments, however, section 523(a)(8) 
still does not reach the particular type of loan at issue in this 
case. 
 Santa Fe urges us to consider the purpose of the funds 
received instead of the purpose of the parties in determining the 
type of the loan it made to Dr. Crowe.  It cites In re Ealy, 78 
B.R. 897 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) for the proposition that "[t]he 
test for determining whether a loan is a student loan is whether 
the proceeds of the loan were used for 'educational purposes.'"  
Ealy, 78 B.R. at 897, quoting In re Vretis, 56 B.R. 156, 157 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985).  But we ask ourselves:  how far can the 
term "educational purposes" be stretched?  Santa Fe did not 
provide to Dr. Crowe a means to obtain an education in exchange 
for the loan.  The "purpose" here was not to facilitate Dr. 
Crowe's education, which had long since been completed; instead, 
and this is undisputed, the purpose of the funds was to  induce 
Dr. Crowe to accept employment with Santa Fe by providing her 
with a means to repay her obligation to the NHSC, an obligation 
  
which arose as a result of a scholarship.  That said, however, 
Santa Fe asks us to go further.  It contends that in addition to 
determining the purpose of the loan, we must determine the nature 
and character of the debt.  Here, Santa Fe relies on Pelkowski, 
wherein we noted that "the focus of section 523(a)(8) is on the 
nature and character of the loan, not how the recipient actually 
spent the money."  Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 741, quoting In re 
Roberts, 149 B.R. 547 (C.D. Ill. 1993). 
 We believe the record amply supports the bankruptcy 
court's finding that the loan made by Santa Fe to Dr. Crowe had 
the nature and character of a buyout.  It was made solely for the 
purpose of securing her services and, as such, cannot be fairly 
characterized as an educational loan or benefit.8 
                     
8
.   This case does not involve loan consolidations, which 
courts routinely have viewed as "educational loans," within the 
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).  There is even a federal 
statute permitting such educational loan consolidations.  See 20 
U.S.C. § 1078-3.  Several courts have determined that 
consolidation loans meet the § 523(a)(8) definition and that the 
date of the consolidation loan starts the running of the 
seven-year limit of § 523(a)(8)(A).  See Hiatt v. Indiana State 
Student Assistance Comm'n, 36 F.3d 21, 25 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We 
conclude that, in cases in which a debtor has consolidated her 
educational loans pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1078-3, the plain 
language of section 523(a)(8)(A) requires that the 
nondischargeability period commences on the date on which the 
consolidation loan first became due."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 
1109 (1995); Martin v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Assoc., 137 B.R. 
770, 772 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) ("[T]he court finds the 
consolidation loan is an educational loan covered by 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523(a)(8)(A) . . . .  The consolidated loan is nondischargeable 
because it first became due less than five years before the 
bankruptcy filing."); see also In re Roberts, No. 91-7241, 1933 
WL 192816, at *3 (D. Kan. May 19, 1993) ("The court . . . agrees 
with the majority of courts deciding this issue and concludes 
that the date the debtor's consolidated loan first became due is 
the date for determining dischargeability under § 523(a)(8)(A).". 
  
 Furthermore, we do not find the loan "similar in nature 
to [a] student loan."  See Appellant's Br. at 19, quoting 136 
Cong. Rec. H13288.  Although the loan was made by a nonprofit 
institution, was unsecured and was used to repay an obligation 
incurred in return for an educational benefit, nothing in the 
express language or the legislative history of section 523(a)(8) 
convinces us that Congress intended for loans such as the one at 
issue here to be non-dischargeable in a chapter 7 bankruptcy. 
 Moreover, in light of what we have determined to be the 
intended purpose of section 523(a)(8), it is also significant 
that whether or not Santa Fe is ultimately repaid by the Debtors, 
neither the federal treasury, the solvency of the NHSC nor the 
public service obligation of Dr. Crowe will be affected.  The 
debt to the educational lending program has been repaid and the 
service obligation has been deemed fully satisfied.  See 
Appellant's App. at 230a-31a.  Furthermore, we agree with the 
bankruptcy court's observation that to the extent this decision 
might be interpreted as discouraging the refinancing of 
educational debt (a position advanced by Santa Fe which we 
consider to be of dubious merit), the purposes of section 
523(a)(8) will not be frustrated. 
 VII. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the 
loans made pursuant to the terms of an employment contract which 
are used, in turn, to repay educational debt are not, themselves, 
non-dischargeable educational loans within the meaning of 
  
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court. 
_________________________ 
 
 
